Following so many detailed explorations in this book of the different issues which comprise the relationship between the UK and European human rights is a difficult task. This conclusion seeks to reflect upon, and emphasise, some of the major points identified in the collection, as well as offer a limited analysis of the collection's editors on what we view as one of the most pressing issues on the current political agenda in the UK: the future of human rights protection.
1 See, for example 'Lord Sumption gives the 27th Sultan Azlan Shah Lecture, Kuala Lumpur, The Limits of Law, 20 November 2013,' available at www.supremecourt.uk/docs/speech-131120.pdf; Lord Mance, 'Destruction or Metamorphosis of the Legal Order?' at the World Policy Conference, Monaco, 14 December 2013, available at www.supremecourt.uk/docs/speech-131214.pdf; Lord Justice Laws, 'Lecture III: The Common Law and Europe', Hamlyn Lectures 2013, 27 November 2013, available at www.judiciary.gov.uk/wpcontent/uploads/JCO/Documents/Speeches/laws-lj-speech-hamlyn-lecture-2013.pdf; and The Rt Hon. Lord Judge, 'Constitutional Change: Unfinished Business', University College London, 4 December 2013, available at www.ucl.ac.uk/constitution-unit/constitution-unit-news/constitution-unit/research/judicialindependence/lordjudgelecture041213/. 9 Nicholas Bonsor, the Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, in reply to a question on McCann said: 'The judgement of the majority, based on no new evidence and defying common sense, has done nothing for the standing of the court in the United Kingdom.' (HC Debs, Vol 265, col 60, written answers). Sir Nicholas Lyell, the Attorney-General, gratefully pointed out in Parliament, however, that the judgment had 'no effect in our law save in relation to costs.' (HC Debs, Vol 265, col13, 30 Oct 1995) . Thus, unlike in relation to the prisoner voting cases, there was no need for majority support at Westminster in order for the UK to comply with the Strasbourg judgment. 10 A Hough, 'Prisoner vote: what MPs said in heated debate ' Daily Telegraph (London, 11 February 2011) www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/8317485/ Prisoner-vote-what-MPs-said-in-heated-debate.html. example, the UK government has not just intervened in order to indirectly 'reopen' the litigation against the UK in the prisoner voting context, but also in an attempt to change the approach of the Court of upholding the absolute prohibition of torture under Article 3 ECHR. 11 Clearly it is open for states to make use of procedural tools available. However, in the light of the fundamental nature of the protection of Article 3 ECHR in the Convention system, an approach of 'silent' erosion seems not only inappropriate, but also conflicts with the conscious responsibility at times demonstrated by UK judges in dealing with the Convention. Efforts to restrict the extraterritorial application of the Convention, as discussed in the Clare Ovey's chapter in this collection, also form part of this 'silent' erosion.
While the voluntary nature of the ECHR as an international treaty does give contracting parties a residual influence over its future, the Convention's role of ensuring protection for human rights across Europe, including protecting individuals from their own governments, cautions against such governmental interference. Threats such as those seen in the Conservative Party's recent proposals which envisage withdrawal from the system unless the system changes to suit that political party's priorities, not only belittle and deprecate the position of human rights throughout Europe; they also reflect a fundamental misunderstanding of the function and significance of an external human rights control -for any state.
It would be a mistake to focus solely upon external relationships when considering the UK and European human rights. Some of the most problematic and strained relations are entirely internal to the UK. Under the HRA, the Westminster Parliament gave a clear instruction to domestic courts to interpret legislation in a way that is compatible with Convention rights so far as it is possible to do so, together with a power to issue a declaration of incompatibility where such interpretation is not possible. It also, and this may be the most significant element in the present context, ensured that courts and tribunals were themselves bound by the Convention rights, meaning that it would be unlawful for a court to reach a decision that is incompatible with the Convention rights. Despite this, the role of domestic courts in upholding the Convention rights can bring them into conflict with the UK's Parliament and executive branches. Thus, for example, the declaration of incompatibility 11 Following Chahal v United Kingdom, App no 22414/93, Reports 1996 -V, (1997 ways it is doubtlessly a 'fourth power', but that power also depends on the freedom of expression itself (as discussed by Robert Uerpmann-Wittzack).
Thus, the relationship between the UK and European human rights has many strings to it. Some are strained to breaking point; others remain in a condition conducive to productive dialogue. Having outlined these different types of relations, it will now be considered why some are under strain.
II. Why the 'Strain'?
The strain identified and discussed throughout the chapters in this collection seems to arise from a number of distinct issues, albeit issues that are interrelated and frequently fudged beyond recognition which, in itself, is part of the problem.
• the 'sovereignty' elements,
• the 'rights' element;
• the 'foreign' (or 'Europe') element and the externalisation of rights;
• the nature of the debate in the UK and other observations.
A. The 'Sovereignty' Element(s)
In many ways, the UK's relationship with European human rights is largely influenced by the 'European' element or, in other words, perceived 'sovereignty' issues. This in itself breaks down into two distinct concepts. First, there are issues of the UK's national sovereignty (state sovereignty) and the manner in which it is reduced by membership of the EU and also arguably, although less obviously, by ratification of the ECHR. Second, there is the Westminster Parliament's parliamentary sovereignty which is often confused or conflated with the first notion of sovereignty.
National, or state, sovereignty is a defining feature of statehood and refers, in brief, to a range of relevant characteristics, which include the existence of an internal body with authority to rule the state and the effectiveness of the exercise of its control throughout the territory, and an ability to make decisions on action to be taken on the international plane, including the degree of freedom of decision and action from external restraints and influences, as well as the ability of the state to influence other states. In its internal dimension, relevant in our context, sovereignty entails the right of a state to be free from intervention in internal affairs which is overlapping with the expression of the right to selfdetermination of its population. and originally implemented externally) within its domestic scheme of protection for human rights, it is in fact entirely understandable because of an absence of home-grown rights. As
Brice Dickson fully explains in his chapter, the home-grown element of rights protection (namely common law rights) remain under-developed. And this is for the very reason identified above: the idea of a court imposing legal restraints upon parliament is an anathema to the UK constitution, or at least has been so for hundreds of years.
Although it must also be said that the 'flexible' UK constitution has been able to accommodate European influences much more easily than some continental systems which are corseted into non-derogable constitutional principles. For example, it can be said that the parliamentary sovereignty has been able to accommodate supremacy of EU law as a formal concept -on a formal construction of parliament limiting itself but not legally irreversiblemuch more easily than other states in Europe which are tied by substantive clauses in their constitution. However, under even this more evolved version of parliamentary sovereignty in the UK, human rights are exactly such a substantive limit which it is more difficult to accommodate within the UK's constitutional framework.
B. The 'Rights' Element
This leads onto the second element in the UK's relationship with European human rights, namely the growing scepticism about the very concept of human rights. This is not just a rejection of a particular European mechanism for protection of rights, but a broader distrust of human rights in general. Indeed the phrase 'human rights' is increasingly used as a shorthand for meddling bureaucracy, in a similar way to the denigration of 'health and safety' from something that should be overwhelmingly positive to something that carries with it an implicit pejorative sense.
There is some history of rights scepticism within the UK, partially linked to scepticism towards courts which historically were extremely conservative in the era of establishing labour rights. There is also an increasing move towards rights scepticism in academic literature. 22 However, times and paradigms have changed. The scepticism about rights within our current context of European human rights seems far removed from these other movements.
So, what exactly are the objections to human rights today? One obvious objection, evident in most newspaper reports critical of 'human rights' (and in many casual conversations as well), is that they protect the wrong people. This perception is analysed by
Lieve Gies in her chapter on the media, including the rather arbitrary nature of who is considered 'deserving' in this context. The idea that there are people who deserve human rights and other people who have forfeited them is simply irreconcilable with the concept and function of human rights, based as it is upon inherent values of equality and human dignity and the functional rationale of limiting government which is not to be trusted.
Such popular hostility towards human rights is frequently based on a lack of understanding of how human rights operate. It should also be remembered that very few rights (especially in the Convention rights) are absolute in nature. The fact that every single human being is entitled to the protection of all of the rights does not mean that those rights cannot be legitimately limited on the basis of conflicting interests within a democratic society. Human rights law (at least in its current manifestation within Europe at this time)
does not prioritise an individual right over all other considerations; it simply requires, in general terms, that any limitation of such a right is non-arbitrary and pursues a legitimate aim in a proportionate manner. To draw from a commonly discussed scenario: the fact that an immigrant has a family life within the UK does not preclude deportation if that is a proportionate response to the need to protect society from crime, but it does require a sensitive balancing of those potentially conflicting interests, rather than a knee-jerk reaction.
A second common objection to human rights at the present time, especially in the context of European human rights is the claim that those rights are being expanded. This is seen particularly in the context of the right to respect for private life in Article 8 ECHR.
Consider, for example, the comments by Lord Sumption in 
D. The Nature of the Debate in the UK and Other Observations
The debates about European human rights in the UK reflect some characteristics which distinguish them from debates in other European states. The chapters in this collection that address other countries' relationships with European human rights indicate that the British debates appear to be more extreme, both in the sense of elevating a specific issue to a reason to criticise the entirety of the system, and perhaps also in the sense of the vitriol of the language used, especially by the media, in contributing to the debate.
It appears to be a particularly British approach to adopt an all or nothing scenario and to readily and repeatedly discuss an exit from the EU and ECHR. Other European countries, even when encountering their own culture clashes with the ECtHR do not seem to resort so quickly to exit scare scenarios, as we can see in the comparative chapters in this collection.
For example, France, as described by Constance Grewe in her chapter, experienced some severe conflicts going to the structure of government institutions and the organisation of the judiciary (in relation to the participation of the commissaire du gouvernement in deliberations of judges in administrative proceedings which conflicts with Article 6 ECHR) 27 which was received with an outcry. However, criticism was discussed in a subject matter oriented way and even segued -over time -into an acknowledgment of an overall improvement of the human rights protection in France.
Similarly, as Julia Rackow demonstrates in her chapter in this collection on the German perspective, while there is some criticism of the ECtHR in legal and political circles, and within public opinion, such criticism tends to be issue oriented rather than, as in the UK, fundamentally challenging the legitimacy of the entire ECHR system. Rackow also notes that, in Germany, issues concerning adverse judgments of the ECtHR tend to be viewed as judicial matters, for resolution by the courts, and not matters on which the legislative or executive branches of government would generally seek to intervene. This again stands in stark contrast to the approach in the UK, where the question of the appropriate role of the courts and Parliament is central.
In Russia, constructive judicial engagement with the Convention has made a direct contribution towards ensuring that confrontation has been avoided. As Bill Bowring explains in his chapter, an issue which had potential to be as politically sensitive in Russia as the prisoner voting saga is in the UK did not result in the level of outrage experienced in the UK when dialogue and pragmatism won out. Growing confidence in using the language of rights In relation to Italy, Oreste Pollicino's chapter identifies a strained relationship between the ECtHR and the Italian Constitutional Court (ICC), but this seems largely based on potential conflicts between a constitutional system of fundamental rights and the ECHR system. In Italy, review for conformity with the ECHR has become part of domestic constitutional review, going beyond a mere 'taking into account' of the ECHR. Pollicino notes how the ECHR has moved from being 'an almost unknown walk-on character in the case law of ICC to being one of its central protagonists' 28 but this has also necessitated the elaboration of new judicial techniques by the ICC in order to achieve a balance between
Italy's constitutional system of fundamental rights and the ECHR system.
A similar struggle can be identified in France and Germany. However, is must be noted that although the German Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) has rejected the ECHR as its formal standard of review in favour of German constitutional rights (on the basis of a dualist approach to unincorporated treaties), it would be too simplistic to present this as an inward looking reliance on the own bill of rights and possibly even 'constitutional identity'.
The FCC is required to take the ECHR and ECtHR decisions into account, and only departs from them if important reasons warrant it. Moreover, the German Constitutional Court recently has developed its cooperative approach further in declaring decisions of the ECtHR (against whatever state party) as 'factual precedent', as Julia Rackow points out in her chapter.
Austria is perhaps the country with the closest comparison to the UK, given that the domestic fundamental rights regime in both countries relies heavily on the ECHR. Andreas
Th. Müller's chapter in this collection is, therefore, illuminating in illustrating the additional complexity resulting both from multiple sources of human rights within one constitutional setting and from relying on an external source domestically. It shows that a multiplicity of sources of domestic human rights protection may be manageable. Significantly, the two chapters on the Russian perspective in this collection both express concern at the risk of 'contagion' of the negative attitude towards the ECHR system from within the UK. There is genuine concern that the UK might lead a trend towards noncooperation in the face of unpalatable judgments, and even 'exit talk' from the ECHR. The nature of human rights issues facing Russia is far removed from the current position of human rights within the UK and any act of defiance by the UK government against a judgment of the ECtHR is therefore a dangerous precedent elsewhere in Europe. As Bill Bowring notes, adverse judgments against Russia in the context of Georgia and/or Ukraine carry the potential to lead to outright defiance, or even denouncement, of the ECHR. It is a terrible time for the UK to be setting such a bad example.
III. Relieving the Strain?
Having considered the different types of relationships between the UK and European human rights, and analysed some possible causes of strain in, at least some of, those relationships, it is now necessary to consider how that strain could be relieved.
Before doing so, it may be worthwhile to note that the two contributors to this volume with greatest experience in living the relationship are inclined to deny the existence of strain, at least within the judicial context. While there are certainly some signs of strain in extrajudicial pronouncements of other senior judges, it may be that the dialogue which already decisions of the European Human Rights Court. He even threatened to quit the court.' 29 The manner in which the UK redefines its relationship with the ECtHR, if it seeks to do so, will have implications within the EU, the Council of Europe and across the world.
B. Strengthening the Institutional Aspect of Human Rights Protection in the UK
Other means of relieving the strain in the relationship between the UK and European human rights might involve a strengthening of the independence of the judge, or at least, as a start, more sensitivity that the independence of the judiciary is even a relevant issue in the circumstances. Such an awareness amongst government might help to alleviate the worst forms of 'scolding' of courts and lead to a shared appreciation of the importance of a convention that it is not acceptable for government to scold judges for the content of their judgments. 30 In other words criticism by other branches of government should not
significantly go beyond what the constitutional division of power provides to correct judicial mistakes and to protect independence of the judges where they are prevented from 'talking back' (as Mark Ockelton's chapter demonstrates).
Approaching the perceived problem from the opposite angle, it could be asked whether a unique UK solution might be to add and strengthen a majoritarian overlay to human rights, by entrusting Parliament with the final word on human rights issues. Alice Donald's chapter suggests the possibilities that lie in this direction. Clearly, ultimately a tension will remain as the very rationale of human rights lies between majority decisions and minority protection. However, such tensions can be reduced by a process that is linked to the constitutional tradition of the UK, open and informed debate in the parliamentary process of the human rights issues and problems involved. The creation of the Joint Committee on Human Rights points in this direction, but might be strengthened.
C. Home-grown Human Rights
More optimistically, further development in 'owning' human rights or developing homegrown human rights would be a positive move, and may relieve the strain both on the two 29 U Kenyatta, 'Ruto the Acting President as I attend ICC case' (CapitalFM, 6 October 2014) www.capitalfm.co.ke/eblog/2014/10/06/ruto-the-acting-president-as-i-attend-icc-case. See also Adam Wagner, 'Kenyan President uses Tory human rights plans to defend war crimes charges' (UK Human Rights Blog, 24 October 2014) ukhumanrightsblog.com/2014/10/24/kenyan-president-uses-tory-human-rights-plans-to-defendwar-crimes-charges. 30 The erosion of the existing convention was recently discussed by The Master Of The Rolls, Lord Dyson, 'Criticising Judges: Fair Game Or Off-Limits?', The Third Annual Bailii Lecture, 27 November 2014, available at www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/bailli-critising-judges.pdf.
sovereignty elements and on the foreign/European elements of this relationship. By homegrown human rights we do not mean home-grown rights designed to lower the standard by the Convention, to emphasise a traditional notion of sovereignty, or to provide a stronger bargaining chip in the relationship with Strasbourg (by providing opportunities to rely on newly created national constitutional identity in order to bypass international human rights obligations -or even worse: water them down throughout Europe). A domestic bill of rights is unlikely to be a recipe to give the government more leeway in human rights issues as the tension between the courts and the government will continue also under a domestic bill of rights. A domestic bill of rights will allow a clearer distinction between the international and the domestic layer of human rights (and thus end any debates about the 'mirror' principle), but its mere existence will not automatically and overnight embed a human rights culture.
Rackow, for example, points out that in Germany the human rights culture is closely linked to a 'constitutional review culture'. But what becomes apparent is that the dwindling acceptance and consensus about human rights in the UK may be part of the problem, and exacerbated by the 'foreign' element. As law as a social construct depends ultimately on its acceptance, drastic debates are deeply concerning and must be taken seriously. Ultimately the significance of human rights and their persuasiveness must speak for themselves, i.e. under the proverbial Rawlsian veil of ignorance, abstracting from specific situations. However, the development of a basic social consensus may be supported by the existence and development of home-grown human rights, their institutional embeddedness, be it in the powers of review by the courts or institutions such as the JCHR, and a more widespread human rights education, leading, so it is hoped, to more informed public debates, responsible use by those in power and the development of a more principled human rights jurisprudence by the courts.
The HRA may have been designed to 'bring rights home' but many in the UK do not yet accept them -and they are not 'forced' to as the 'foreign' element discussed above always provides for a convenient escape -the externalisation of human rights. Home-grown human rights could be developed in a variety of ways, such as by the common law or by a domestic codification. A written domestic bill of rights may be a faster, more structured and overall more appropriate way of developing domestic constitutional principles and human rights, as argued by Sionaidh Douglas-Scott in her chapter, but the common law can be used more to assist in the task, and maybe the answer is to pursue both alleys in a complementary, mutually supporting way.
The common law has potential to do far more than it does currently to protect human rights. Indeed, there is a history of common law rights dating back to Coke CJ in the seventeenth century which was briefly revived pre-HRA in an extra-judicial capacity in the 1990s. The HRA seemed to negate the need for common law protection and, as Brice
Dickson's chapter discusses, the courts have turned their back on earlier attempts to develop common law rights to work alongside the rights in the ECHR. However, the failure of the public to engage with the Convention rights within the HRA suggests that, whether the HRA survives the next election or not, there is an important role to be played by the common law in protecting home-grown rights at a domestic level. Questions will remain to be answered, of course, as to how such rights might be effective against a sovereign Parliament and it is clear that they could not alone provide a sufficient replacement for the HRA.
Leaving the common law to develop UK human rights (apart from the slower, haphazard nature) would in all likelihood also not significantly engender public debate and education of human rights -they would remain a technocratic matter confined to the judicial process. Embarking on a codification exercise has at least the potential, if linked to a widespread consultation, to promote wider discussion, and provide more opportunity for the development of a human rights 'culture' within and outwith the courts. It could also be used issue. It may be asked, however, whether untangling domestic human rights protection from the ECHR in the UK would decrease the influence of the UK jurisprudence in Strasbourg which results largely (but not only) from the direct application of the ECHR and the volume of jurisprudence generated by UK courts (recalling that this an important potential benefit of the HRA). But this would merely put the UK on an equal footing with virtually all other states in Europe. Moreover, the influence depends on a number of factors which either continue to exist or are in the control of the UK, such as whether the ECHR would continue to be directly applicable in the UK (a feature that distinguishes it from some continental jurisdictions, including Germany where the ECHR only informs the interpretation of domestic law); the quality of human rights reasoning; and, last but not least, the accessibility of domestic judgments: undoubtedly the UK enjoys the huge advantage of using a lingua franca.
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D. Developing a Human Rights 'Culture'
Despite being one of the intentions underlying the 'bringing rights home' ethos of the HRA in the later 1990s, there is still a lack of human rights culture in the UK, where the scepticism about human rights has only increased in the intervening years. Education of the public, media, politicians and lawyers about the nature and function of human rights would inevitably lead to better informed debates and better judgments at all levels. By human rights 'culture', we mean an informed approach to human rights, both by those in power and ordinary citizens, an owning of human rights as a valuable achievement of the polity and citizens, and good quality human rights reasoning in the legal sphere, derived from principle.
In other words, we are seeking a culture of substantive and constructive debate rather than an a priori dismissal of human rights as foreign, insidious and self-serving; an environment where scapegoating of human rights is not acceptable.
One persistent obstacle to building a constructive rights dialogue in the UK is the conflation of the two Europes. While historically the EU and the Council of Europe share a common overall goal -the preservation of peace and liberal democracy in Europe -they are distinct organisations. They are two different 'clubs' with overlapping membership but significantly different rules. This does not seem to be a difficult concept to grasp and yet it seems to elude many interested parties from members of the press, to members of the government, to a significant proportion of first year law students.
In part because of this coalescing of the two Europe's in public perceptions, it would be extremely useful to distinguish the rights issue from other 'Europe' issues. Whatever one's position on the UK's place and role in 'Europe', an effective guarantee of individual rights necessitates an external oversight. The oversight does not have to come from Strasbourg, and indeed there may be scope for reform there, but it has to come from somewhere outside of the UK. The Strasbourg system is by far the most advanced and successful of human rights regimes, and it would be unfortunate and short-sighted were that success to alienate the UK, one of its founding parties, but the need for external oversight on human rights issues is not 31 The importance of accessibility of their judgments in order to contribute to European or international debates is not lost on higher national courts as it becomes increasingly common for courts outside the English-speaking world to provide English translations or summaries of some of their judgments.
inevitably linked to the UK participating in 'Europe' (much less the EU) and both debates would benefit from being untangled from the other.
Finally, and related to the above issue, it is important to emphasise that public fears and misgivings about 'European judges' telling 'us' what to do are entirely misplaced in the human rights arena. In cases against the UK, the ECtHR judges are informing the UK government where the limits of its powers lie. Similarly the CJEU in this context will inform the EU where the limits of its powers lie. It is the job of these courts to protect the people of Europe from their governments and the institutions of the EU respectively. Without such protection, there would be inadequate legal remedies when a public body kills, tortures, degrades, or infringes freedom, nor would there be such incentive to prevent these actions.
The UK government does infringe rights, as does every other government to a greater or lesser extent, and it will not always be just the rights of other people that are infringed.
IV. The Future Relationship
At the time of writing, the future relationship between the UK and European human rights looks undeniably bleak. The Conservative Party's proposals to repeal the HRA, rewrite so as to limit the application of, the Convention rights and even potentially withdraw from the ECHR entirely are a sobering reflection on what is likely to be the nature of the debate about human rights in the UK at the upcoming election and beyond. Perhaps it is only in the UK, with its unique combination of a constitutional commitment to an out-dated concept of parliamentary sovereignty, a Eurosceptic tabloid press, and a distinctly British island mentality, that a proposal to repeal the only domestic legal protection for human rights is likely to be seen as a political asset ahead of an election.
From a number of perspectives (historical, institutional interest, perhaps even political), it is not in the least surprising that a political party which hopes to form a government would wish to remove the legal restraints upon its powers imposed by human rights laws; yet, from the perspective of a modern constitutional state and considering that those campaigning for a removal of such restrictions aspire to hold government office, it is utterly surprising. For those of who believe in, and support the application of, human rights, the task is to change the perception of human rights amongst the public so that it is no longer a vote winner to promise to remove them. Common sense speaks to this: human rights have their strongest instinctive appeal when they are viewed as benefits for us as individuals against the exercise of public power; they have a weaker appeal for many when seen only as benefits for other (often 'undeserving') people. It is, of course, no surprise that most human rights cases involve the least popular members of society (prisoners, suspected terrorists, mental health patients, immigrants) because it is they who are most likely to have their rights infringed. But a government unrestrained by human rights law puts us all at risk. The ECHR system is currently the best means of ensuring that the UK government respects the rights of everyone within the UK's jurisdiction, and future developments within the EU are likely to strengthen that protection. There is room for debate on how specific rights are interpreted, how proportionality is determined, what measures are needed to remedy violations, and many other important issues on which even human rights experts are divided, but if the UK wishes to contribute to answering these questions, it needs to be an active participant in the protection of European human rights. The multi-faceted relationship between the UK and European human rights has to be worked upon at all levels in the hope that one day 'human rights' will not have a more negative connotation in the UK than in the rest of Europe and the world beyond.
